Euthyphro
About 2400 years ago the Platonic dialog Euthyphro was written
describing the dilemma of goodness; what is it and how is it grounded?
Socrates was waiting outside the courts were he would be tried for
corrupting the youth of Athens. He met a
young man, Euthyphro, who was bringing charges against his father for
murder. He explained to Socrates that his relatives are angry with him
because they believe it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father.
Euthyphro claims they know nothing of what 'the divine law is in regard
to holiness and unholiness.'
Being a
man who likes to discuss ‘big questions,’ Socrates asked Euthyphro what
he thought holiness was. Euthyphro responded with a few proposals which
Socrates in his skeptical manner deconstructed; Holiness is prosecuting
the wrongdoer who commits murder or steals from temples or does any
such thing, whether he be your father or you mother or anyone else, and
not prosecuting him is unholy, holiness is what dear to the gods,
holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods which is a
science of sacrificing and praying to the gods. Ultimately the dilemma
was boiled down by Socrates to, ‘is some thing (or action) good in and
of itself and this is why both God and men love these things, or is
some thing (or action) good because some god (or man) wills it to be
so?’
If
Socrates' question truly is an either/or proposition then it would
forever remain unanswerable. Socrates exploded both of Euthyphro's
basic propositions of what makes some certain thing (or action) good
and/or holy as being absurd. If God determines what is good by process
of arbitrary decision, to what then does He post His declaration to? If
you say to the world, then a dependency is created with God being
dependent upon something outside of Himself for one His qualities i.e.
‘God is good because some things in the world are good.’ This would be
similar to one of us men making the same kind of declaration—‘I’m good
because this thing here is good.’ This is absurd. If what is good is
recognized by God and men, what is it them that recognizes the goodness
of the action or thing? By what measure is goodness discriminated from
the bad? There is a glaring absurdity here. On one hand you have
ungrounded recognition on the other arbitrarily chosen good things or
actions. The dialog ends with the implication that the question, 'Is
that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy
because it is loved by the gods?' is unanswerable.
I would
say that good is and of itself and that good is God; not by an
arbitrary declaration He made but by His essential nature. God is good.
Any good that we recognize is reflection of His nature. When God
finished creating things He saw that, ‘it was good.’ It couldn’t be
otherwise.
Any
ethic not metaphysically based on an ultimate cause is without
foundation and as such would be ultimately meaningless. The statement
'all is relative' is an obvious contradiction. It is obvious we live in
an ordered world where we agree on many propositions as indeed being
true and good. Some things are clearly better than others, we all
recognize this. This implies that there is something fixed from which
we can measure from. So an ultimate fixed reality must be to provide
foundation for mutual agreement. Now I'll define some conditions to
build a foundation to answer the question.
Ultimate
reality is necessary to existence and must exist in and of itself, that
is, it is self-existent and therefore not subject to cause.
Self-creation is absurd because the thing would have to be and not be
at the same time, so there is no answer here. We are obviously
contingent and we endure constant change so then it is obvious we are
subject to cause. So then we are not qualified to define reality, but
only to experience it as creatures. In other words, the necessary
qualification to be the Creator is self-existence outside of the
created world. So is this being "wholly other?"
We are
somewhat like our cause because we are an effect of the cause, because
of a necessary relation between cause and effect. We have personalities
and mind so then it seems reasonable to believe that the cause has a
personality and a mind. (I realize that I’m reasoning from effect to
cause, it is impossible for me to do otherwise.) We have intelligence
so our cause must have intelligence and so on... Also it is silly and
contrary to experience to say that an effect can be greater than its
cause, so this is no answer either. To deny any qualities that we
experience in ourselves of our Creator ultimately denies the existence
of these qualities in ourselves; all basis for knowing ourselves (and
good) would be destroyed. Since we have reason and we can recognize the
relationships between cause and effect, we can infer certain qualities
that our Creator, who is greater than us, must have because we have
them.
We
universally agree upon many things and action as being good or better
than others. The differences between cultures are really minor; murder
and stealing, for example, are universally thought of as being bad and
charity is universally recognized as being good. To measure something
there must be a point to measure from else the measurement would be
meaningless. Since we recognize good and that some things (and actions)
are better (or worse) than others, we can then infer that there is a
defining point to measure from. So the question is, are things (or
actions) good or bad because God arbitrarily declares it so, or are
things (an actions) good in and of themselves?
Without
the Necessary Being, God, there would be nothing, no space, no time, no
matter, no motion, no motives and no actions. So by Him all things
exist and have their being. Such a being could not change in nature
else he would cease to be what he was and become something else. In
other words, by necessity, a Being necessary to existence cannot change
in nature; He cannot become, He can only be. Since God can only be, all
other things (and ideas) that become are dependent upon Him for their
existence. So then if God is Creator and goodness is universally
recognized in His creatures and as such is indeed measurable then God
is the measure of all things, including good, by the very nature of who
He is. Good would then be fixed to its source.
God is
good. So when His creatures violate moral law, they violate God's
nature which is good. Good is a thing-in-itself because it is God's
nature. This anchors moral judgment to a fixed, unmovable point,
establishing an absolute moral standard from which we can measure.
I don’t think
that Socrates
was seeking knowledge from Euthyphro. Socrates was known for being
critical of
the stories about the gods, with all their moral contradictions. This
case in
particular I think Socrates knew from the get go that Euthyphro's
initial
assertion was undefendable. I think his primary purpose was to teach
Euthyphro
that he really didn't know anything about the will of the gods. Also, I
don't think that Socrates foundation for knowledge was relativistic,
but rather it was unknowable being that we exist within such a limited
condition. Lastly, I think that Euthyphro is a poor philosopher; his
arguments
were poorly thought out and he refused to wrestle with the question.
I have never held to the doctrine that truth is
man defined.
Even as struggling atheist I could never convince myself that we indeed
could
do this. Within the framework of the reality of an external world that
would
exist and function quite well independent of us, we simply do not have
the
power to affect in the way some say we can. This is why I also reject
unfounded
claims of revelation; this is like a man claiming to know something,
but after examining
him we find out that he does not. I think moral knowledge and reason
are
common; given to us that we may be able to examine and test the truth,
so that
we may then know it.
Euthyphro stood on unfounded claims of and about
the gods. Socrates merely
examined them and found them wanting through simple reason. Euthyphro
in his
pride would not listen to reason, and so not come to the truth that he
knew
nothing of the gods and their wills.